“Constitutional Methodism in Crisis” – A Response
By Rev. Jerry Eckert
July 18, 2019
Introduction
I would like to join the conversation about the crisis facing our denomination. I fully support the effort by two distinguished, knowledgeable, and experienced experts in church law and history to identify the problem(s) facing us. There is no way to resolve a crisis if we do not nail down exactly what that crisis is. Too much effort is lost when people try to solve the wrong problem.
The two writers of “Constitutional Methodism in Crisis” are the Rev. Dr. William Lawrence, past president of the Judicial Council who teaches church history at Perkins School of Theology and Southern Methodist University and Dr. Sally Curtis AsKew who has served our church in many offices, including being Secretary of the Judicial Council and then being clerk for the Judicial Council after her retirement. I know them and regard them highly and respect what they offer. The viewpoint they share in their article in THE METHODIST REVIEW (Vol. 10, 2018) should be read and taken very seriously.
Their basic premise is that our denomination’s pending schism is compounded by a weakening of our commitment to being an organization founded on a constitution. They point to serious violations of our constitution. They point to key groups like the Council of Bishops and Judicial Council as having drifted away from their constitutional limits. They then in very helpful fashion show how “constitutionalism” came into being, how it affected the denomination as it went through the dynamic stresses of the past two centuries, and where they think it has broken down to the point where it cannot be trusted to help us through the current pressure to split.
While I disagree with them on what is the primary problem, as I will show in more detail below, we must take seriously that because human beings are the ones who are asked to work within the constitutional structures, I agree that we must see if we can resolve the crisis using constitutional measures.
Do I have credentials to join in this argument?
Before going further, let me introduce myself to those who have no idea if I have background enough to have any credibility.
Academically, I have a degree in anthropology (like Bishop Jack Tuell and Rev. Billy Graham) with many hours in history, sociology, and psychology taken in five undergraduate years at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Extension Division and Madison. My BD was earned in four years with extra credits in church administration and pastoral care at Perkins School of Theology, SMU, Dallas, Texas. I was a Masland Fellow at Union Theological Seminary. New York for a year enjoying a wide variety of courses since it was not focused on a degree program. And I gave a year to Union Seminary in Minneapolis working on an unfulfilled Doctor of Ministry program.
My career was as a pastor. Out of personal experiences (see Judicial Council Decision 492) and being asked for help on church personnel matters, I was drawn into learning church law on the fly and collaborating to develop an ad hoc organization (Associates in Advocacy) to help pastors in trouble. I observed at six or seven General Conferences and a dozen Judicial Council open hearings. I have submitted hundreds of petitions to General Conferences from 1976 to 2012. I appeared before the Judicial Council four times (once on behalf of an ethnic bishop), and I have written extensively over the years about what I observed in the Church and especially about Judicial Council decisions in a blog, www.aiateam.blogspot.com/.
My “creds” do not match those of Drs. Lawrence and AsKew. My standing is what the reader gives me. I have worked and interacted with many of the major groups in our denomination. My viewpoint differs in that I come as an advocate rather than as one of the church officers who made decisions affecting those for whom I was counsel.
If you will allow me, I present my critique respectfully, hoping it sheds light on the problem the good doctors are trying to illuminate.
A Little Background
But first, let me start at a different place. With background in anthropology as well as history, I offer the following as an even broader context than given by the writers. A part of the problem, as I see it, is that at least two sides are sure they are right because they are coming at the problem using an understanding of law that is different and to which they are more committed than to using constitution-based law.
“Law” at its most basic level is putting order onto one’s experience in the hope of surviving. Maintaining an adequate amount of food, water, and shelter in whatever environment an individual lives underlies whatever rules individuals set for themselves. Particular rules of survival will differ between those living in the Artic as compared to those living at the Equator. And there are variations for each person living anywhere between.
When another individual moves into or is found in the neighborhood, the two in order to survive establish an understanding that means each modifies his/her personal survival rules in a way that keeps both individuals alive.
That humanity survived as a species can only be attributed to the early realization that “doing unto others as we would have them do unto us” was the only way to go.
But of course, humanity’s survival meant that more and more people became involved in sharing an environment. The strong and the smart faced dealing with the weak and the slow within their own group and among the other groups in the area. That led to a proliferation of “social contracts” which underlies our understanding of law today.
Some groups used autocracy which gave all rule-making to one individual (where the strongest or smartest took that role without anyone being able to stop him/her). Some groups established a chief with a council that consulted with the chief before decisions were made. Some groups had only the council to deal with rules. And some groups felt everyone in the group should make decisions as the basis of their social contract..
Each of these forms were more or less successful depending on environmental changes, motivation of the leaders and councils and the rest of the people, and how they interacted with other groups they encountered in or near their area.
Groups in the same area with similar “social contracts” tended to blend together. Where the leadership structures differed, the attitude of “live and let live” usually kept things peaceful. However, where autocratic leadership styles existed, there was a tendency for competition, ambition, greed, and desire to control that led to conflicts, the survivors of which had to work out a way to continue to survive and the strongest and smartest tended to lead the reorganization, usually in favor of the style of the ones who had more strength and resources left at the conclusion of the conflict. That led to rationales being built that made the changes more palatable such as legends, origin stories, and memorable sayings and their later more elaborated forms (Holy Writ). And then as larger bodies worked out their coming together, the rationales took the form of agreements and laws. In addition, as differing social contracts for decision-making were combined and some kind of directions were needed to protect the basic social contract of mutual survival and to re-write rules and laws as the environment changed or conflicts within the large human group came up, constitutions arose in some bodies which divided the power among the multiple decision-making entities so that the other social contract needs could be met in an orderly fashion. Not all social contracts have chosen to use a constitution. Some find others work to the satisfaction of their leaders and/or their followers. (This typology does not mean to make any one social contract better, more Christian, or more evolved. While “constitutionalism” is chosen when survival is pretty much assured and assumed, it may not be more or less effective a social contract than those which may be on the edge of survival.)
Understanding that this is a simplistic rendering of the history of law and society which may not take into account every variation or factor in human history, I lay this out to give context to where the argument of Drs. Lawrence and AsKew resides in our current history.
They see the problem being that the United Methodist Church is very vulnerable to schism because of the breakdown of commitment to staying within the lines of the constitution by some key entities of the denomination, citing the Council of Bishop, the Judicial Council, and officers of the General Conference as illustrating that declining commitment.
My argument is that they are wrong about who the major parties to the conflict are but they are at least partly right about the fundamental issue.
Where they are wrong
I use the word “wrong” only to point out that certain of their illustrations are not crucial to their search for the problem to be solved. As I said above, they are seeking to identify the nature of the problem so that a solution can actually make the needed changes to resolve the problem. I join them in that seeking. But I hope that critiques like mine will come out in order to refine the definition of the problem so it can be sought out and laid to rest.
There are three entities noted (one twice) they say best illustrates the problem. Let me deal with the easiest first, which I see as wrong in two ways..
The writers’ choosing the decision by the Secretary of the General Conference to re-vote one of the constitutional amendments was not really that valid. One matter that was botched by a misprint, even if it was about a crucial change in the constitution, does not constitute a lack of commitment to the constitution. Whether strictly constitutional or not, his action really only illustrates the rare times the General Conference officials used discretion in a way that really caught anyone’s attention. The matter is not actually concluded yet because the General Conference can still ask the Judicial Council to review the legality of the re-vote.
The second reason I think Drs. Lawrence and AsKew erred in bringing up this mistake is that it really appears to add cover to their most serious illustration. They had to find something to illustrate their premise that commitment to the constitution is declining all around by scrounging for something from the legislative side. Having committed to identifying the Council of Bishops and the Judicial Council as illustrations, it only makes sense to look at the third branch of our separated powers, the General Conference.
Having observed many General Conferences, I have already pointed out ways it does not work properly, especially on personnel matters. See my blog postings from 2008 and 2012 in particular.
Has the Judicial Council caught up with all the unconstitutional decisions the General Conference has made? By no means.
But having fought those battles since 1980, I do not fault the General Conference for being intentionally declining in its commitment to constitutionality. It has been manipulated but not completely so and I believe it still is intent on “staying within the lines” of the constitution.
Let me now address the second entity scrutinized by Drs. Lawrence and AsKew, the Judicial Council.
The decision chosen by them to illustrate decline in commitment to constitutionality does not, to me, show any such decline. Let me get into that after exploring the Council’s past as I observed it.
It is my opinion that the Council’s record on most things has been predominantly objective. Since it was formed in 1940, there has been one area where it had a very strong pattern: siding with the bishop in personnel cases. The number of exceptions can be counted on one hand until 1993, when for that quadrennium, there was a clear effort for the Council to be objective.
From 1997 until 2008, the Council again tended to accede on personnel matters to bishops stepping on the constitutional rights of pastors bringing challenges. That changed dramatically when for most of the past decade, with a few exceptions, ordinary pastors’ briefs actually seemed to be read and decisions in their favor were not only granted but taken as opportunities for the Council to teach the bishops how to do personnel work!
My take on the overall performance of the Council is that they are pretty likely to “dance with the one who brung ‘em.” The Council of Bishops nominated them (most Council members since 1940 were nominated by the bishops. Only a few were elected from floor nominations, though that is becoming more frequent (part of the dynamics raising the specter of schism). I happen to think that the Council was politicized to the degree it supported bishops inappropriately on personnel issues for most of its existence on that one kind of issue. There was one period where it was strongly politicized in other regards under James Holzinger away from the bishops but that showed up in only one personnel case (two decisions, Nos. 1031 and 1032). Fortunately for the Church, the polarized Council was nearly evenly divided so the politics only rarely became an issue. So far, I do not see the current Council politicized out of whack enough to say it is declining in its commitment to the constitution. While the Council, as a human institution, has not always been consistent in its upholding the constitution, particularly in personnel cases, it has not done so based on inclination to ignore the constitution. Based on my assessment, the Council has finally come around to being more objective about challenges by pastors of bishops on personnel things and staying within the constitution.
Let me now address the decision of the Council that my colleagues used to illustrate their premise that the Council has drifted away from commitment to the constitution. Actually, the writers go even further than “drifting.” They write, “…Constitutional United Methodism is operationally put at risk.”
Before exploring the details they cite to show that danger, I wish to point out “constitutional Methodism” has withstood “operational” risks before. Let me cite two examples.
JCD 524 gave cabinets freedom to remove pastors by putting them on involuntary leave of absence in violation of constitutional right to trial and appeal. According to my research, pastors who would have been given a second chance by transferring to another annual conference, were now being removed from ministry against their will. Coincidentally clergy morale plummeted and has not really recovered. But that was thirty five years ago and the United Methodist Church is still around.
JCD 663, a much more obscure decision, changed the way annual conferences handled their budgets. The Council allowed budgets to be set in categories rather than in discreet missions. Where before annual conferences conducted plenary business long into the night discussing the merits of its mission projects and other outreach programs in order to decide which would receive funding, now all that “parliamentary stuff” the Discipline called for could be replaced by Bible studies and hearing from visiting dignitaries. Conference members. lay and clergy, no longer hear on the floor from the marvelous ministries going on around their state. Coincidentally, apportionment giving began to decline. That was twenty seven years ago and we are still here to have a discussion about operational risk.
JCD 1341 is threatened by the groups related to Good News as driving people from the denomination because it shows how the Church refuses to deal properly with homosexuals. That threat is rather empty, really because the Council has a long track record back to 1993 coming down on one side and then the other of the debate. So in historical context, last year’s Oliveto decision is just one of many and is highly unlikely to have the impact on denominational operations as have JCDs 524 and 663..
But let me end this digression to see if Drs. Lawrence and AsKew made their point about the risk posed by the Council’s decision No.1341.
Their critique is three fold. One, they say the Council rewrote Paragraph 304.3 to include bishops. Two, they say the Council rewrote what it takes to make self-avowal by adding a public record, a marriage license as a “rebuttable presumption.” Three, they say the Council turned liturgy into law by saying a self-avowed practicing homosexual could not be consecrated bishop. Let me state each argument more fully and then critique it. Remember, they are trying to demonstrate that JCD 1341 shakes the constitutional foundations of the UMC in risky ways.
One, Drs. Lawrence and AsKew point out that the key passage about homosexuals not being allowed to be clergy does not include bishops. They say the Council has no authority to add them. And in adding bishops to the clergy under Paragraph 304.3, they say the Council has now inserted itself into the authority of the annual conference to determine clergy fitness under the Discipline.
I argue, as they themselves point out a few sentences later, that bishops are Elders, not a separate category of ordination, and thus are included in the word “ministers.” As far as the Council inserting itself into an annual conference process related to candidacy, ordination, appointment, or prosecution is concerned, the writers do not spell out the way they see that happening. The Council has always had the authority to “apply” the Discipline to situations presented to them about real circumstances facing particular individuals or matters under Paragraph 2610 for sure and presumably under Paragraph 2609. That is not “intrusion” or “insertion” beyond their authority.
Two, Drs. Lawrence and AsKew point out that the introduction of a public record like a marriage license between two persons of the same sex adds that to a footnote to Paragraph 304.3 about how a person goes about self-avowing their homosexuality. The Council, by identifying that as a “rebuttable presumption,” has made the accused have to prove the marriage license does not include practicing homosexuality, which violates .the right to presumption of innocence.*
I argue that a marriage license is seen by the Council as possible evidence of a homosexual physical relationship but evidence that must be proven by the prosecution. Someone still has to be “in the bedroom” as an independent witness in order to validate a physical relationship. (Even both alleged participants would not count because they could be misrepresenting their relationship for political purposes, hence the need for an independent witness.)
The use of the civil law phrase “rebuttable presumption” carries with it the presumption of guilt that the accused has to rebut. I do not think the Council intended to cross the line into that problem.* Since the Council introduced the term, it has the right to define it and hopefully they will repurpose the word in United Methodist usage to be consistent with presumption of innocence.
Three, Drs. Lawrence and AsKew point out that the Council says that a self-avowed practicing homosexual may not be consecrated, which in the writers’ minds indicates the Council used liturgy as law. Having pointed out that the Discipline contains much more than law, including theology, social principles, and history, the writers say that the Council has jurisdiction over only matters related to law and constitution. By applying law to liturgy, the Council overstepped its bounds.
I argue that if the Council had faced this argument during their deliberations, they would have felt it more important to answer a question than worry about whether they had crossed some kind of line. I suspect they would have felt that all they were doing was saying if someone were found to be a practicing homosexual by fair process, of course they would not and could not be consecrated bishop.
I am glad the writers raised these three issues. I bet they had more arguments they would love to have raised in the deliberations over JCD 1341, the kinds of deliberations they experienced when they were on the Council. I bet they had to edit their article as well, just as I am sure the Council did in preparing JCD 1341 (see my blog posting on this decision). They belong in the arguments.
But . . .. I do not see any of the three really violations of the constitution. They nudge at the edges. They stretch the boundaries but not very much. They do not have the consequence of eliminating right to trial or taking away from an annual conference the right to argue over the funding of the conference’s programs and missions.
Like the writers, I worry about the phrase “rebuttable presumption” with its civil law baggage of presumption of guilt in its use outside the church.* At worst, the phrase violates “presumption of innocence.” But at best, it updates church law to relate to the reality that civil law now allows same sex marriage which is as public as a pronouncement to certain individuals and bodies of the Church. JCD 1341 makes a marriage license something “rebuttable,” not just prima facie proof that does not even require trial.
To summarize my assessment of the weight of Drs. Lawrence’s and AsKew’s argument that there is a diminishing trust in commitment to the constitution by the Council, I am not persuaded. What they point out as serious mistakes by a General Conference officer and their disagreement with one particular controversial and complex Judicial Council decision, when taken in historical perspective, can be taken as the occasional possible misstep under the constitution, which in most other ways is completely sustained, as much as is humanly possible.
In these respects, I think that Drs. Lawrence and AsKew erred.
But every serious research was undertaken for a reason and is not necessarily to be disregarded because of some possible errors. Let me now turn to where I believe they were right.
Where They Are Right plus the Elephant in the Room
The third entity called out by the writers is the Council of Bishops (hereinafter referred to as “the Bishops”). They strongly and all-too-briefly criticize the Bishops for trying to control the output of the Commission on the Way Forward and for decrying the results of the constitutional amendment votes which triggered the revote.
If, as the writers assert, there is a constitutional crisis facing the United Methodist Church, there is no question that the Bishops are a party to it.
Before I discuss the “elephant in the room,” let me both expand on the writers’ premise and anticipate the main critique leveled at me since 1980.
As a youth in high school and young adult in college and seminary, I tended to be one of those who got along well with adults. I got along with my peers. I was taught critical thinking and had enough mettle to ask the first question, discovering early on that once that ice was broken, others could join in much more freely. I even got A in classes for knowing the right answer, a lot of As actually, all during my academic career. I learned in first grade that I had to accept the fact I was not the smartest person in my class so I am open to not being right. It’s just that I am rarely entirely wrong. Just sayin’.
When I attended my first annual conference (Wisconsin) as a Deacon under the old system, I was impressed with the fact that debate on the floor of conference included serious but respectful challenges of what was said, whether between two equally mature and competent conference leaders or between the bishop and a Deacon just a couple years older than me.
My second annual conference visit was as an observer during my last year at seminary, the North Texas Annual Conference. There, the only ones who spoke on the floor were agency heads, superintendents, and the presiding bishop. Only Albert Outler dared to seek the floor. Every other pastor and lay person was silent. Even though many of my friends at seminary were from North Texas and I was very comfortable with clergy friends I made while serving on the Denton District in a student appointment, that experience made going back to Wisconsin a no-brainer decision when I graduated. The spirit of openness and of bishops and leaders in the conference being peers was cemented by the administration of Ralph Taylor Alton, our bishop.
Put in simpler terms, I got along with most people in authority. During CPE in 1967-68, the psychological evaluation included nothing about difficulty with authority figures.
Then in 1980, the tone of leadership changed. My style of the “William Penn approach” as everyone’s’ peer stopped working. In their official capacities, bishops became less open to questions, more angry with disagreements with their ideas and decisions, and downright vindictive in response to challenges such as raising questions of law.
A shift had occurred in the Council of Bishops from being a support group to being an advocacy group intent on gaining control of whatever they could. In 1980, they got authority to initiate involuntary leaves of absence and their superintendents became “enforcers” instead of support systems for pastors. Bishops obtained considerable control over annual conference budgets with the 1991 JCD 663. Not allowed to prepare petitions for General Conference, they more and more openly focused on sending petitions through the General Board of Higher Education and Ministry that strengthened their hand at being able to more easily get rid of pastors, despite the set back they had with the introduction of Fair Process in 1992. When difficulties arose over bureaucratic leadership among the boards and agencies of the Church, The General Conference turned to the Bishops for help and they took over by flooding the boards with other bishops as members and taking the role of presider over each agency’s board. They established their own quadrennial emphases over and beyond that of the General Conference and got funding for their programs which left the rest of the church with less resources.. They took over the 2012 General Conference and wasted days with their attempt to sell a plan which would shrink the influence of advocacy agencies who had criticized them or could (Role and Status of Women, Religion and Race, and Archives and History). And now as noted by the Lawrence/AsKew paper, they have tried to take over the Commission on the Way Forward’s role going into the special session of the General Conference in 2019.
Based on my observations as an advocate for pastors in trouble and trying to follow the system’s constitution and Discipline to help the Church be more fair, I have kept bumping into the Bishops and their intrusion on the whole life of the Church.
Please hear me when I say that I have known dozens of bishops over the years and can count on one hand those who were not engaging, attentive, gracious, and peers in their conversations with me. For some reason, it seems as though that small group of ungracious, inattentive, and non-engaging bishops have set the tone for the whole Council of Bishops. The ambition, the need to control, the sense of privilege that makes up what many call the “administrative culture” of the Council of Bishops has somehow been allowed to flourish among some of the smartest, most committed people in our denomination.
I believe that Drs. Lawrence and AsKew have offered a very grave argument which points to the lack of commitment for upholding the constitution of the Church. They have properly identified one of those parties.
While I happen to disagree that the other two major branches , the Judicial Council and General Conference, are parties to the crisis, though one must always remember we are one generation from the collapse of any social contract, I agree that there is more than one party to the crisis.
Practically speaking, the writers avoided identifying the other party, the caucus threatening to split the denomination, Good News and friends.
I have worked along side them in my conference mainly on mission trips. I have worked along side them in advocacy on cases, some all the way to the Judicial Council. I have had them as respondents for whom I have advocated. I still am in touch with some that are leaders in the Wesleyan Covenant group (as I am friends with and in touch with some leaders on the “left”). On occasion, I have had long discussions which have yet to change anyone’s minds, except on matters of church law where we usually agreed!
For that reason, just as our history described so well by the writers shows, I believe that just as the northern and southern branches of Methodism both established constitutional structures for their respective denominations, both sides of a split in 2019 will keep the constitution and 98% of the laws and other things in the Discipline. Though the Church may split, I see colleagues in both continuing to consult on personnel cases and other church law issues. Constitutional commitment, except among the Bishops, is alive and well with the right and left wings of the Church..
What Then Is the Crisis?
No problem is singular, generally speaking. This one is multi-faceted. Even my final analysis is likely to be simplistic so I hope others will join in the argument so we can reach the best analysis of the problem. Then we may be better able to solve it.
My original sense of where the groups associated with the anti-gay movement was that it was a power grab by them, using extortion (“We will leave the denomination if you do not outlaw homosexuality”), the main tactic used since 1972.. Sensible people do not think they would actually leave because who wants to be in charge of half a denomination saddled with law suits over very expensive properties? From the beginning, the crisis was a manufactured one.
The EUBs and Methodists before merger were not all upset for or against gay rights. The 1972 bruhaha over homosexuality came out of a law suit lost by the Baltimore Conference to a gay pastor when a civil court made the conference restore him to his appointment from which he had been removed. (This was before the Supreme Court’s 1976 Serbian Orthodox decision which basically ended civil jurisdiction over church personnel matters.) A caucus formed around preventing homosexuals from being ministers. They have become better funded and organized over the years, pushing that agenda and matters related to it. The caucus grew to where it could form its own mission society and other shadow groups to that of the General Conference.
Please understand that in the late 1960s through the 1980s, most liberals were closet homophobes mainly because they really had no experience with or serious academic training about homosexuality.
That left the field open to those who could use proof-texting with great facility to dominate the dialogue. It took decades for the left to finally catch on to what Walter Wink did: show how even the most fundamentalist people disregarded parallel laws to those about homosexuality in the Old and New Testaments. But the left did not have the leverage or desire to threaten leaving. The left could say science could resolve the issue but the right already had it resolved by the Bible. The two sides could not and still cannot agree on a common authority.
In that kind of power struggle, the anti-gay forces had the leverage, the threat about withdrawing, and God being more on their side than on the left’s!
And maybe that is the key to understanding the nature of the crisis. Being a social scientist, I read that key this way:
While most of us work within a constitutional social contract to resolve differences within the Church, knowing that specific situations require flexibility and compromise within the structure, we have difficulty with those who have a different social contract by which they are operating.
The Council of Bishops operate under a social contract that within the denomination and within their annual conferences they have the last word, they make the rules, they need to control the outcomes so they are satisfied and show they are worthy leaders.
The anti-gays operate in the social contract that within the denomination, it is the rationale that holds their group together. The “legends, memorable sayings, and origin stories” (I am quoting my sociological terminology but those who live by them take them as utterly sacred) that they feel are needed to help them survive literally are the glue that hold them together as individuals and as a group among all the other groups with whom they share an environment.
Got that?
Their social contract is at a survival level.
Where the “traditionalists” use survival absolutism language, the Bishops are moving toward an even more primal concern for survival pursuing autocracy, though they would never admit to it.
In one sense, the “constitutionalists,” the “traditionalists” dependent on a rationale making their social contract palatable (the Bible), and the Bishops, each using a social contract that has worked to hold groups together, are now facing off on how to continue living together in 2019.
“Come on,” you say, “you are just laying out the obvious. Is there supposed to be a clue in there somewhere that brings us closer to identifying the problem? At least Drs. Lawrence and AsKew limited the their understanding of the crisis to a lack of commitment to the constitution.”
I reply that they overplayed their hand on stating the degree of commitment actually displayed by the Judicial Council and the General Conference. I contend neither body has really gone beyond the range of their normal occasional lapses with little actual impact on the survival of the denomination. I strongly agree that the Council of Bishops has lacked a commitment to the constitution for decades, moving away from any limits on their authority and toward their own control.
What the writers failed to do is show just how deep that “lack of commitment” is. It is my opinion that the Bishops have been devious in that endeavor, manipulating our system to increase their power. And there are few voices willing to say that for fear that the bishops might retaliate.
That is an aspect of our crisis I am willing to discuss. It is a crisis that needs to be faced.
My opinion is that this is the direction that Dr. Lawrence and Dr. AsKew are pointing and they are “scary” right.
“But,” you say, “there is nothing about that crisis that is being handled at the 2019 General Conference. In fact, the Bishops are standing up to the separatists and doing anything, constitutional or not, to prevent a split.”
I reply, that you are now looking at a layer of the crisis, the hornswaggling by the Bishops which is distracting the Judicial Council and the Way Forward Commission from doing their jobs under the constitution.
The underlying crisis over splitting is really between the constitutionalists willing to have differences of belief and liturgical practice, unafraid of basic survival issues in our environment, and the “traditionalists” who are also constitutionalists on one level but whose gut tells them their survival is based on the authority of their Bible in that same environment!
Conclusion
My addition to the conversation begun by Drs. Lawrence and AsKew is to show there is not one conflict in this crisis, but two, though their contribution essentially does that since the potential split of the denomination motivated their work.
They pointed to the breakdown related to lack of commitment to the constitution. I have suggested that both major parties struggling for power do so out of differences in their social contracts that are both more elemental in which each struggles to survive on their own terms.
The Roman Catholics handled these elemental differences by asking each faction to agree on one thing, the primacy of the pope. Those that did kept their social contract and survival within the bounds of a secondary social contract with the Pope. The Eastern Orthodox Church survived because of a common enemy, the Western (European) Church and the Crusades. The World Council of Churches has survived by accepting the sovereignty of Jesus Christ, however each denomination defined that for themselves.
Now, having cited how some others have survived blowing apart, adding to how Methodism came back together in 1939 as the writers described, and having divided the crisis into at least two smaller pieces, I look forward to others joining the conversation with further ideas of how social contracts have been restored in the history of the Church and the history of other comparable institutions. And I call upon everyone to further dissect the crisis into even smaller pieces each of which might actually be more manageable.
*UPDATE: "Rebuttable presumption" is a phrase, I'm told by several competent resources, that it not just used in civil law but also in criminal law. In criminal law, it does not retain "presumption of guilt." The resource people clarifying this with me say that under church law, the marriage license would have to be understood as a possible clue to physical intimacy but is insufficient to be taken as "clear and convincing evidence."
